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CHAPTER 3
The Impact of German Energy Policy 
on Household Energy Use
Eoin Grealis, Annika-Kathrin Musch and Henrike Rau
Abstract  This chapter reviews current energy policy and civil  society 
efforts to achieve the targets set out for Germany’s Energiewende 
(Energy Transition), with a specific focus on their impact on household 
energy use. The existing energy governance structure, conflicting energy 
policy commitments, and the emergence of public resistance to renewa-
ble infrastructure are identified as significant challenges for national-level 
policy. At the household level, the dominance of efficiency and smart 
choice solutions and the pressure to maintain traditional patterns of con-
sumption are identified as key limiting factors in an effort to deliver real 
reductions in household energy use.
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IntroductIon
Germany has committed to a number of targets in order to achieve a 
 successful Energiewende (energy turn), the transition to a sustainable energy 
system. These include 60% of total energy demand being supplied from 
renewable resources and a total greenhouse gas emission (GHG) reduc-
tion target of 80–95% of 1990 levels by 2050 (BMWi 2015). While the 
country has recently made progress in some areas, particularly with the 
deployment of renewable energy capacity in the electricity sector, cur-
rent forecasts suggest that Germany will miss its interim GHG emissions 
target of a 40% reduction on 1990 levels by 2020. Instead, the Federal 
Ministry projects a reduction of 32% over the same period. Additionally, 
recent policy commitments to a faster phasing out of nuclear power have 
limited nuclear’s capacity as a non-carbon-intensive ‘bridging technology’ 
(albeit one that presents other sustainability risks) until such time when 
technological and infrastructural solutions are in place to ensure the stabil-
ity of supply with large-scale renewable deployment. In order to achieve its 
stated emissions targets, Germany must reduce annual GHG emissions at 
a consistent rate of 3.5% per annum on current levels for the next 30 years. 
Considering that the 30-year historical average is a reduction of 1.2%, and 
the 10-year average just 0.8%, this presents a significant challenge (EEA 
2019), which must be addressed by several sectors, including households.
SocIo-MaterIal dynaMIcS of HouSeHold  
energy uSe In gerMany
Households account for approximately a quarter of total energy demand 
in Germany, ranking third behind the industrial (47%) and services sec-
tors (26%) in 2017 (BDEW 2018). Total residential energy demand is 
dominated by space (68%) and water (14%) heating requirements, with 
the remaining energy use accounted for by lighting and appliances 
(8%), cooking (6%) and other uses (4%) (Eurostat 2018a). Household 
energy consumption is still dominated by fossil fuels, including oil- and 
gas-fired heating systems (gas 37%, oil 22%), with electricity (21%1), 
1 Of 20.8%, 12.9% was generated from fossil fuels sources in 2017 with the remaining 
7.9% generated from renewable sources (Fraunhofer Institute 2018).
3 THE IMPACT OF GERMAN ENERGY POLICY ON HOUSEHOLD ENERGY USE  23
renewables (11%), derived heat (8%) and solid fuels (1%) providing the 
rest (Eurostat 2018b). Germany ranks 6th out of the EU28 in terms of 
per capita electricity consumption, with the International Energy Agency 
reporting an average consumption of just over 7000 kWh per annum in 
2014 (IEA 2014).
Dwelling location, type, size, tenure and household composition are 
significant factors in the determination of household energy use. At 40%, 
Germany has the third highest proportion of single-person households in 
the EU (Eurostat 2019a), which translates into a comparatively higher 
average per capita living space. With a predominantly clustered pattern 
of settlement, 77% of the 82.9m population live in either an urban or 
predominantly urban location, with just 23% classified as living in rural 
areas (Eurostat 2019b). Consequently, apartment and other shared 
dwellings serve the majority (approx. 60%) of German households, with 
the remaining residences consisting of a mixture of detached (26%) 
and semi-detached and terraced housing (Eurostat 2019b). The high 
instance of apartment living has meant that shared private spaces and ser-
vices are widespread and culturally acceptable. For example, shared laun-
dering facilities in the basements of apartment complexes are a common 
occurrence while utility costs associated with common areas are often 
divided among residents.
With regard to tenure, lifelong tenancy is a common and widely 
accepted cultural phenomenon in Germany. Germany has the highest 
rate of household tenancy (49%) and the lowest rate of home owner-
ship (51%) in the EU (although higher than Switzerland) (Eurostat 
2019c). This can be attributed to a mix of both historical redevelop-
ment (inclusion of the private building sector in post-war social hous-
ing schemes) and comparatively strong tenancy rights. However, high 
tenancy rates have the potential to reduce the market for sustainable 
investments if tenants do not receive a share of the benefits, both in 
terms of energy saving measures (e.g. retrofitting) and renewable gen-
eration (e.g. solar). This has been recognised under recent amend-
ments to the Renewable Energy Act (2014), which ensures that tenants 
and landlords both receive a share of return from sustainable energy 
investments through a subsidy paid for domestic electricity production 
(BMJV 2018).
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energy PolIcy In gerMany
Energy policy at the federal level in Germany is dominated by 
supply-side and infrastructural legislative measures, largely influenced by 
both its implementation obligations under EU directives2 and national 
policy documents. Technical regulations derive primarily from the 
Energy Industry Act governing grid network charges, transmission, 
reserve, access and default supply, while regulations governing the tran-
sition to less carbon-intensive energy supply stem primarily from the 
Renewable Energy Sources Act (BMJV 2018). The latter broadly pro-
motes the advancement of technological and market solutions that will 
enable Germany to reach a target of 80% of power generation from 
renewable resources by 2050.
Recently, Germany has made significant progress on the penetra-
tion of renewables, particularly in the electricity sector, with renewables 
accounting for 38% of net public power supply in 2017 (Fraunhofer 
Institute 2018). However, the accident at the Fukushima nuclear power 
plant in 2011, and subsequent political developments in Germany 
(particularly in the state of Baden-Württemberg3), have had a signifi-
cant impact on Germany’s nuclear energy policy, with the Federal gov-
ernment removing nuclear power as a defined ‘bridging technology’ 
towards achieving the Energiewende and legislating for a decommission-
ing timeline for most nuclear power plants by 2022 (BMJV 2018). As 
a result, increased levels of renewables may now result in a correspond-
ing increase in the use of fossil fuels for electricity production (Renn 
and Marshall 2016). Consequently, attention among Energiewende cam-
paigners and advocates has shifted towards decommissioning coal-related 
technology and infrastructure, as exemplified by the Ende Gelände move-
ment that seeks to stop the use of coal.
In addition to the technical barriers to renewable expansion, there is 
also mounting public resistance to Energiewende projects, most nota-
bly in relation to wind farm developments and the construction and 
2 Flowing from both the EU Climate and Energy Package (governing the 20/20/20 tar-
gets) and the European Climate and Energy Framework (outlining targets for 2030) policy 
frameworks.
3 In 2011 the Green Party won the State elections in Baden-Württemberg, partly because 
of its ability to capitalise on the Fukushima incident to promote proposals for a rapid 
‘energy turn’ towards renewables.
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upgrading of power lines. In 2014, the German government, respond-
ing to increasing public resistance to the implementation of local energy 
transition projects and the required upgrading and expansion of the elec-
tricity grid, agreed to slow down the expansion of renewable energy pro-
jects and limit further expansion to ‘development corridors’ as well as 
revising the aims of the Renewable Energy Act (2014). While the pri-
mary policy focus had up to this point been on the accelerated decar-
bonisation of energy used to create electricity, recent developments are 
beginning to shift attention towards demand-side policies, together with 
associated ordinances such as the law on the eco-design of energy-related 
products (BMJV 2017).
While overarching policies are developed at a Federal level, much of the 
practical actions required to deliver a successful Energiewende fall on local 
municipalities and civil society. The highly devolved nature of local admin-
istration means that local municipalities are primarily responsible for either 
taking direct action (in terms of their own energy use/supply) or indi-
rect action such as providing the necessary conditions for private/semi- 
private sustainable investments or supporting civil society actions aimed at 
lowering energy consumption. The capacity and extent of municipalities’ 
engagement in such actions is a result of the available resources (budg-
etary and physical), the extent of devolved administrative competence, 
and the level of political prioritisation, which may differ considerably 
both across and within each State/Bundesland. As a consequence, the 
Energiewende is likely to progress at different rates across Germany. In 
fact, in some instances past policy both at the Federal and State levels has 
clearly undermined renewable energy development with overly prescrip-
tive development restrictions, resulting in an effective ban of particular 
types of generation in certain areas (Naßmacher and Naßmacher 2007). 
For example, the controversial ‘10H’ regulation, introduced in Bavaria in 
2014, requires any installed turbine to be a minimum distance of 10 times 
the turbine height from any residential building (Bayerische Bauordnung 
2018). This effect of this regulation has been to substantially restrict the 
siting options for wind energy infrastructure.
The opportunity of private individuals and communities to participate 
directly in the transition by investing in renewable energy projects has 
been central to the successful increase in the proportion of renewable 
energy used in electricity generation over the last ten years. It has been 
estimated that 46% of installed renewable capacity was owned by farmers 
and private citizens in 2012 (Borchert and Wettengel 2018). However, 
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changes to the Renewable Energy Act appear to have caused a drop off 
in co-operative investment regulations, with a transition away from feed-
in-tariff supports to bid or auction systems (Morris 2014). Such systems 
can be problematic for citizen co-operatives, which typically only plan to 
realise a single project and cannot therefore split the risk of a lost auction 
in contrast to large-scale commercial developers who can bid for several 
projects at once (Amalang 2016).
Although more recent signals at the Federal level clearly favour a more 
centralised Energiewende, the German energy transition also involves a 
decentralisation of energy production and the emergence of new actor net-
works in so-called energy regions (Gailing and Röhring 2016). Between 
the level of municipalities and the federal level, the formation of collabo-
rative network-based governance is considered a determining factor for 
the success of regional energy transitions (Gailing 2018). An example 
for a bottom-up regional multi-level governance project can be found in 
the Oberland region in Southern Bavaria. Here, Energiewende Oberland 
(EWO), a civic foundation for energy transition founded in 2005, has been 
identified as the decisive actor responsible for institutionalising the energy 
transition and for building effective networks and governance structures 
regarding the energy sector in the region (Von Streit and Bothe, in review).
Yet despite the emergence of active regional networks (such as in 
the Oberland region), efforts towards a decentralised energy transition 
continue to meet unfavourable political and regulatory conditions set at 
Federal and State levels that favour a centralised Energiewende.
trendS In natIonal HouSeHold energy  
caMPaIgnS In gerMany
National household energy campaigns have primarily focused on, and pri-
oritised technical solutions, with the primary future vision for a success-
ful Energiewende reliant on improved technical innovation, greater energy 
efficiency, passive/carbon positive housing, improved energy transmission, 
and high-tech grid management in order to enable greater proliferation of 
renewables (BMWi 2018). This trend is also evident in campaigns aimed 
at changing energy-related behaviour. Here, the focus is firmly on encour-
aging individuals to make ‘smarter’ consumer choices in terms of more 
efficient lighting, heating systems and household appliances, with reduc-
tion of use strategies featuring much less prominently. A recent analysis 
of 60 sustainable energy consumption initiatives (SECIs) in Germany 
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(Jensen et al. 2018) closely mirrored trends in national policy, with the 
majority of initiatives aimed at changing technology and consumer behav-
iour. The continued absence of sufficiency-based strategies (e.g. the 
re-evaluation of necessary consumption) is a notable omission given the 
growing evidence of the inability of efficiency based strategies to fully 
achieve anticipated reductions (Druckman et al. 2011) (Table 3.1).
There is also significant stratification when it comes to particular tar-
geted areas of energy use, with many initiatives targeting one particular 
aspect such as retrofitting, information campaigns targeting purchas-
ing behaviour, saving-potential analysis, and energy or emission saving 
competitions. The large number of SECIs profiled demonstrates a gen-
eral commitment to improving environmental awareness and the will-
ingness to contribute to energy saving and climate protection; however, 
the emphasis on saving (energy and/or money) and other participatory 
incentives reveals that there is a current expectation that SECIs should 
provide ‘added value’ for participants.
Certain ‘basics’ or cultural norms around consumption would appear 
to be less palatable for discussion or negotiation (e.g. car ownership, hol-
iday travel, meat consumption) and have not been targeted specifically 
in SECIs related to energy initiatives. This was also one of the findings 
of the Energiesuffizienz Project, a collaborative research initiative funded 
by the Federal Ministry for Education and Research.
Table 3.1 Problem framings of 60 sustainable energy consumption initiatives 
from Germany
Source Jensen et al. (2018)
Problem framing No. of initiatives
 Changes in individuals’ behaviour
27
 Changes in technology
21
 Changes in complex interactions
8
 Changes in everyday life situations
4
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caSe Study: energIeSuffIzIenz Project
The research project ‘Energiesuffizienz’ (energy sufficiency) was 
undertaken from 2013 to 2016 and was tasked with identifying 
the driving factors and dynamics for the expansion of energy-related 
‘needs’ and how they could be addressed, with a view to achieving 
real quantitative reductions in the size and use of devices, the substi-
tution of technical equipment in households, and the adjustment or 
reassessment of technical services delivered by appliances to utilities 
and desired by users (i.e. smart grid services) (Brischke et al. 2016). 
The approach concentrated on three elements: households, appliances, 
and urban infrastructure and services in municipalities. A criteria-based 
analysis was conducted that examined action and measurement options 
for energy sufficiency in the distinct areas of living and building, as 
well as individual barriers and framework conditions that influence or 
hinder the implementation of energy sufficiency. Based on this theo-
retical framework, empirical studies were carried out which employed 
transdisciplinary methods.
Investigative Approach
Households represented the core subjects of investigation in the project. 
In a representative survey of 601 households, the research team enquired 
as to how energy-sufficiency practices are currently perceived and evalu-
ated, what sufficiency practices are already employed, and whether and 
to what extent additional sufficiency practices may be accepted in the 
future. For example, in the area of living space, participants were asked 
to rate the adequacy of their current living space ranging from ‘much too 
small’ to ‘far too big’. Additionally, there were interviews with several 
actors at the municipal level to analyse existing measures and approaches 
to improve energy sufficiency. The research team used neighbourhood 
labs that drew on five local communities of practice (youth group, local 
co-op, a group of degrowth activists, senior citizens club and a Christian 
seniors group). The research team presented cultural probes to get to 
know the participants and their performances of practices also within the 
group, and held co-creation workshops to counter conflicts with han-
dling sufficiency strategies.
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Framing the Energy Challenge
Brischke et al. (2016) argue that the existing policy measures that foster 
the Energiewende in Germany concentrate primarily on improving energy 
efficiency, and that they ignore energy-sufficiency strategies to a large 
extent. They note that while energy efficiency in many sectors has been 
consistently improved, total energy use has remained stable. They fur-
ther note that efficiency is only one factor of total energy use, and point 
to the fact that the technical characteristics (size, features, etc.), use pat-
terns and total number of appliances have a significant bearing on overall 
energy use. The authors further argue that energy efficiency improve-
ments are being eaten up by higher levels of consumption and/or rising 
expectations of comfort. Consequently, the authors argue that as there 
are technical and economic limits on energy efficiency, energy sufficiency 
will be an important aspect in the energy transition.
In the Energiesuffizienz study, energy was framed as a consumer 
product that in and of itself held little interest for households in their 
day-to-day lives, and that energy sufficiency measures should be devel-
oped in such a way that consumers become aware of which needs and 
wishes are important for a high quality of life (and, conversely, which are 
not). Departing from traditional policy interventions that try to reduce 
the energy intensity of practices without questioning established con-
sumption levels, the approach challenges this prevailing ‘optimization 
orthodoxy’ by seeking to lower demand and reduce energy use.
Outcomes/Outputs
Brischke et al. (2016) found (among other observations) that energy suf-
ficiency practices can play a large role in efforts to reduce energy use. 
These sufficiency practices are already present in many households and 
are regarded as normal. Moreover, they are not correlated with finan-
cial endowment and can be implemented irrespective of incomes. The 
Energiesuffizienz Project also found that sufficiency practices are less 
acceptable in leisure activities than during core household duties, and 
that playing on people’s environmental consciousness or ‘guilt tripping’ 
people into action are not necessarily helpful strategies for promoting 
sufficiency. Sufficiency thinking is largely incompatible with the current 
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status quo, i.e. a growth-based economic system and the dominance of 
efficient technological fixes in sustainability thinking, policy and practice. 
This cannot be easily reconciled with the (more or less) radical change 
agenda that underpins much sufficiency thinking, i.e. that less may in fact 
be more (Grealis and Rau 2018).
Through open innovation workshops, the project design guide also 
provided detailed and specific eco-design sufficiency recommendations 
relating to the reduction (e.g. display and adjustability of cooling tem-
perature, instead of an abstract scale in refrigerators and freezers), substi-
tution (supporting the change in practices and routines towards energy 
and resource conservation through innovative design of the appliances, 
e.g. washing with low temperatures, measured laundry dosing), and 
adjustment of appliances (e.g. equipment should be designed such that 
functions and features only consume energy, when they are in use).
concluSIon
While early progress has been made in the area of renewable electric-
ity generation, Germany faces significant future challenges in this area. 
Similarly, more sustained efforts are needed to achieve real reductions 
in respect of other forms of energy consumption. While Federal policy 
and legislation provide the overarching targets, the devolved and partially 
fragmented nature of energy governance in Germany and its impact on 
bottom-up actions by both local municipalities and civil society mean 
the future rate of change for the energy transition is very uncertain. 
Environmental consciousness and public support for the Energiewende 
are generally rather high. However, transition measures which fail to 
include citizens and local energy co-operatives may slow progress as 
they are more likely to meet resistance from below, especially concern-
ing both grid development and installation of renewable energy tech-
nology. Additionally, some aspects of German culture may clash with 
efforts to achieve real reductions in energy consumption as part of the 
Energiewende. In particular, Germany’s prevailing ‘car culture’ frequently 
combines with a historically influential automobile industry to under-
mine or weaken efforts towards a Verkehrswende (sustainable transport 
turn) that links closely with sustainable energy goals discussed in this 
chapter. The recent heated public debate in Germany concerning pro-
posals for a speed limit of 130 km per hour on all German highways 
exemplifies this conflict. Overall, this overview has shown the need for 
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future policy and change programmes that address systems of inter-
locking energy-related practices (e.g. mobility, space and water heat-
ing, domestic appliance use), as opposed to focusing solely on changing 
Germany’s energy supply system from the top-down.
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